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THE INTERPRETATION OF SURFACE EASEMENTS
IN SEVERANCE DEEDS AS A LIMIT ON
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING PRACTICES
Rachel Heron,* Justin S. DuClos" & Shaun A. Goho*"
Hydraulic fracturing has driven a boom in natural gas production
in the Marcellus Shale. While providing a growing source of domestic
energy, this boom also raises signicant environmental concerns. Many
of the impacts of hy draulic fracturing predominantly affect the inhabitants
of the property where the drilling occurs. Yet when those inhabitants own
only the surface estate, they have relatively little influence over whether
and how the drilling occurs and will not profit from the gas extraction. This
article provides a jurisdictional case stud4 set in West Virginia to assist in
understanding the nuances relevant to an interpretation of the scope of
express and implied surface easements pertinent to mineral extraction.
West Virginia takes a unique approach to the accommodation doctrine. It
permits a surface ovner to argue that certain overly burdensome practices
may not have been contemplated by the parties to the original severance
deed and easement, thus weakening the likelihood of their propriety and
giving surface ovners leverage. Depending on the tlpe of easement at
issue, the analysis can include a review of the burden to the surface, the
nature of surface uses, the necessity of a practice, the compatibility of a
practice, and/or contractual intention.
Rachel Heron is a 2012 J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School.
" Justin DuClos, J.D., Ed.M., is a Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Taub-
man Center for State and Local Government and an appellate practitioner in New
York, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. He is a past Fel-
low at the Harvard Law School Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic
and past Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Center for Public Leadership.
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INTRODUCTION
The news these days is full of stories about the light and dark
sides of the natural gas boom for landowners in the Marcellus Shale
states of New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. On the
brighter side are landowners who have profited from leasing their
land to gas developers, including stories of dairy farmers turned
"shalionaires. On the darker side are the environmental and health
'In December 2011, after the completion of this article, West Virginia enacted a
significant revision of its oil and gas laws to, among other things, address some of
the issues raised by horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. See Press Release,
Office of the Governor Earl Ray Tomblin, Governor Signs Horizontal Well Act
(Dec. 22, 2011), available at http:xx/www.governor.wv.gov newsroom/pressreleas-
es/2011/Pages/GovernorSignsHorizontalWellAct.aspx. This amendment, known
as the Horizontal Well Act, has been codified at W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6A-1-24
(2011). Compensation provisions for damage to surface estates caused by extrac-
tion from horizontal wells were also enacted at W VA. CODE §§ 22-6B-1-8 (2011).
Those provisions are similar to the original oil and gas compensation provisions,
except they now specifically apply to horizontal wells. See W VA. CODE §§ 22-
7-1-8. This article does not directly address the implications of these pieces of
legislation, which include, for example, improved notice to surface owners, see
id. § 22-6A-10, and new distance restrictions for the location of wells and well
pads. See id. § 22-6A-12. The changes, while providing some increases in protec-
tion for surface owners, do not fundamentally alter the analysis presented below
because the analysis is not statutory but rather contractual in nature, i.e. whether
certain extraction practices can be enjoined because they are outside the scope of
an express or implied easement contained in the deed severing the mineral and
surface estates. Notably, § 22-6B- 1(c) states that "[t]his article shall be interpreted
to benefit surface owners, regardless of whether the oil and gas mineral estate was
separated from the surface estate and regardless of who executed the document
which gave the oil and gas developer the right to conduct drilling operations on
the land." Most importantly for our purposes, § 22-6B-4(a) states that, "[n]othing
in . . . this article diminishes in any way the common law remedies, including
damages, of a surface owner or any other person against the oil and gas developer
for the unreasonable, negligent or otherwise wrongful exercise of the contractual
right, whether express or implied, to use the surface of the land for the benefit of
the developer's mineral interest."
2 Rachel Weaver, Marcellus Gas Wells Generate an Amazing Bounty for Land-
owners, PITTSBLURGH TRIBUNE-RLVIEw (Feb. 27, 2011), available at http: /triblive.
com/ix/pittsburghtrib/s_724934.html#axzz29xlAE9ne; see Bill Toland, A Boom
Without a Bust?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 27, 2011), http://shale.sites.
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consequences that can arise when hydraulic fracturing arrives in a
community. Residents complain about toxic fumes, noise, foul - and
even flammable - well water, and other detrimental impacts.
All of these landowners have something in common, however
- they had a choice about whether to allow hydraulic fracturing on
their property. As owners of both the surface and mineral estates on
their property, they could decide whether and how drilling would
occur on their land, and what it might be worth to them. Before any
gas drilling company could begin fracking operations on their land,
it had to negotiate a lease.
By contrast, owners of only surface estates that have been
severed from the mineral estate get all of the bad effects of hydraulic
fracturing without any of the benefits. In this "split estate" scenario,
which can occur anywhere, but is especially prevalent in West
Virginia, the surface rights to the property were severed from the
subsurface rights - often decades or even a century ago - and the
surface owner generally has little or no say in whether hydraulic
fracturing occurs on the property.
This article examines whether surface owners have a
basis for an injunctive remedy in the common law governing the
interpretation of deeds or other conveyances. The act of exceeding
the scope of an easement amounts to trespass. Injunctive relief is
thus an appropriate remedy.' Injunctive relief may alternatively be
appropriate if the surface owner can show that the mineral owner's
actions have risen to the level of a private nuisance.
postgazette.com/index.php/news/ business/23884-a-boom-without-a-bust- ("Gas
royalties and surface-lease payments will make millionaires out of some.").
See Rory Sweeney, Gas Wells a Mixed Blessing on Property, TIMEs-LEADER (Wil-
kes-Barre. Pa.) (Oct. 28, 2010), http://pagasdrilling.com/pennsylvania-natural-
gas-drilling/gas-wells-a-mixed-blessing-on-property/.
' See Shock v. Holt Lumber Co., 148 S.E. 73, 74-75 (W Va. 1929) (finding that
"[a]n unlawful or excessive use of an easement may be enjoined" because "[t]he
attempted excessive use by the defendants of the easement in question constitutes
a continuous trespass to real property, which may, ordinarily, be enjoined") (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Under West Virginia law, actions taken by an easement
holder may form the basis of a private nuisance when they exceed
the scope of the easement. A private nuisance exists where one actor
creates a "substantial and unreasonable" hindrance to another's
enjoyment of his or her property.6 "An interference is unreasonable
when the gravity of the harm outweighs the social value of the
activity alleged to cause the harm."7 As will be discussed below,
this analysis overlaps with the interpretation of easements. Thus,
exceeding the scope of an easement will in some cases ipso facto
trigger a nuisance.
More particularly, because the magnitude of the impacts
to the surface estate caused by hydraulic fracturing are so much
greater than those caused by conventional oil or gas drilling, this
article examines whether surface owners can argue that hydraulic
fracturing was not contemplated by the parties to the severance deed,
and that therefore the right to frack, or at least the right to perform
particular fracking practices, was not conveyed. We conclude that,
at least in West Virginia, surface owners may be able to enjoin some
particularly burdensome modern features of hydraulic fracturing
that are not strictly necessary for extraction.
In Part 1, we review the nature of hydraulic fracturing, its
potential impacts on the property of surface owners, and the recent
expansion of hydraulic fracturing, especially in the Marcellus Shale.
In Part 11, we discuss the dilemma surface owners face when the
surface and mineral estates have been split. In Part 111, we explain
how West Virginia courts interpret the scope of a mineral owner's
easement over the surface and, based on those interpretive methods,
sketch out a legal strategy surface owners might use to limit the
impacts of hydraulic fracturing on their property.
See Quintain Dev., LLC v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 556 S.E.2d 95,
103-04 (W. Va. 2001).
6Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 202 (W. Va. 1989).
7Id.
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I. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND THE MARCELLUS SHALE
As humanity exhausts the world's reserves of fossil fuels,
there is an increasing reliance on extraction from unconventional
sources.8 Compared to conventional sources, these unconventional
sources are generally harder and more expensive to access and
potentially much more dangerous and harmful to the environment.
For oil, unconventional sources implicate off-shore drilling at
previously out-of-reach depths and extraction from tar sands,
like those in Alberta. For natural gas, an increasingly important
unconventional source is deeply-buried shale formations, from
which the gas can be extracted only by means of a process called
hydraulic fracturing - or "fracking," for short - a practice that
takes its name from the literal fracturing of subsurface geological
formations with fluids at high pressures to release trapped oil and
gas reserves.
A conventional gas well is drilled vertically and encased
along the way with steel and cement. Once a reservoir is reached,
the wellhead can be completed to manage the floxx. The pressurized
nature of the reservoir, combined with the low density of natural gas,
allows the gas to flow freely to the surface. There are several kinds
of gas deposits, and some may require separation and purification
interventions when, for example, oil mixes with the natural gas as it
is extracted. Enhanced recovery techniques common to conventional
wells include injecting the reservoir with water before it runs dry so
that any trapped gas is forced towards the well bore.
Natural gas contained in shale formations (called "shale gas")
cannot be extracted profitably through conventional wells. Shale's
permeability is too low, so the gas trapped in these formations will
not simply rise to the surface once tapped. To exploit this source of
'See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY ECONOMICS AND Tim ENVIRONMENT 458 (3d
ed. 2010) (defining "unconventional sources" of natural gas as "sources that are
not 'conventional,' meaning that gas production from the reservoir does not read-
ily flow into a well bore"); EPA, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRiNKING WATER RESOLTRCES 8 (2011) [hereinafter EPA
DRAU PLAN] (projecting that shale gas "will constitute [forty-five] percent of the
U.S. gas supply in 2035 if current trends and policies persist"), availble Lt http://
wwwx x.epa.gov/hfstudy/HFStudyPlan_110211_FINAL_508.pdf.
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gas, drillers need to use horizontal wells and inject large quantities
of water mixed with chemicals at high pressure. 9 The high pressure
water and chemicals cause cracks in the shale that serve as channels
for the gas to move to the well bore.'0 When the water flows out,
sand or another propping agent or "proppant" remains behind to
prop open the cracks through which gas flows.1
"The Marcellus Shale is a sedimentary formation that
underlies most of Pennsylvania and West Virginia and extends
into parts of Virginia, Maryland, New York and Ohio."" This
formation, found at depths of 5,000 to 8,000 feet, has long been
known to contain huge quantities of natural gas, but until recently,
the extraction of this gas was prohibitively expensive.13 In the past
decade, however, the combination of reduced drilling costs and
rising natural gas prices has led to a boom in production from the
Marcellus Shale. It is currently "one of the largest natural gas 'plays'
in the world."' 4 The new wave of drilling in the Marcellus Shale is
bringing fossil fuel extraction to areas that have traditionally seen
little, if any, natural gas drilling.'
Fracking has the potential to cause impacts for surface
owners that are qualitatively and quantitatively different from those
of conventional oil and gas development. One focus of concern has
been the chemicals that are included in the mixture that is injected
into the wells to create the fractures. While companies have fought
efforts to require disclosure of these chemicals,16 reports show
9EPA DRAFT PLAN, supra note 8, at 12.
Id.
"Id.
12EPA, Key Documents About Mid-Atlantic Oil and Gas Development, REGION
3: Ti MID-ATLANTIC STATES, http://xwww.epa.gov/region03/marcellus-shale (last
updated Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter EPA].
PA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: "WHAT IS MARCEL-
LUs SHALE AND WHY TM SUDDEN INTEREST IN IT?," DRILLING FOR NATLUAL GAS IN
TIM MARCELLUS SHALE FORMATION (last visited May 26, 2012), available at http://
files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/BOGMPortalFiles/MarcellusShale/Marcel-
lusFAQ.pdf.
14 EPA, supra note 12.
'PA. DEPT OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 13.
16 This pressure notwithstanding, several shale gas states - notably Wyoming and
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that chemical content may run the gamut - everything from the
innocuous (ice cream thickener) to the toxic (benzene)." There
is some evidence that these chemicals have already contaminated
residential water supplies, which has led to media attention and
legal action." Complaints have ranged from odiferous tap water to
chemical poisoning with painful and vivid symptoms.1
Hydraulic fracturing sites may also utilize multi-acre
impoundment pits to store frackwater, which is the flowback and
produced water that comes up from the well after it has been fracked.
In the past several years, West Virginia residents who own the
surface above fracked mineral estates have seen the emplacement of
these massive pits and associated equipment, as well as dramatically
increased heavy machinery traffic. Fracking processes have also
been associated with disruptions of the water table, groundwater
(including drinking water) contamination, scarring of the surface
land, and destruction of vegetation.
Texas - have promulgated fracking fluid disclosure requirements. See Mike Sor-
aghan, Wyoming Fracking Rules Point the Way for Public Disclosure, WYoFILE
(Dec. 28, 2010), http:/wyofile.com/2010/12xwyoming-fracking/; Texas: Drillers
AMust Disclose 'Fracking'Chemicals, N.Y. TIMEs (June 21, 2010), http://www.ny-
times.com/2011/06/21/us./21brfs-Texas.html. California's legislature is currently
considering passing a similar law. See California Mdulls 'Fracking' Disclosure,
UPI.com (June 23, 2011), http:xx/www.upi.com/ScienceNews/2011/06/23/Cali-
fornia-mulls-fracking-disclosure/UPI-60131308869709.
' See Mike Soraghan, In Fracking Debate, "Disclosure" Is in the Eye of the Be-
holder, GREENWIRE, June 21, 2010, available at http://xwww.eenews.net/public/
Greenwire/2010/06/21/1; see also EPA, PAVILLION GROUNDWATER INVESTIGATION,
PAVILLION, WYOMING: PHASE I SAMPLING RdiSULTs (August 11, 2009), available at
http: //www.epa.gov/regionS/superfund/wy/pavillion/Pavillion_ -WInvestiga-
tionPublicPresentation.pdf; Abrahm Lustgarten, Is New York ' Marcellus Shale
Too Hot to Handle?, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 9, 2009), http://xwww.propublica.org/ar-
ticle/is-the-marcellus-shale-too-hot-to-handle- 1109.
"
8 See Abrahm Lustgarten, EPA: Chemicals Found in Wyoming Drinking Water
Alight Be from Fracking, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 25, 2010), http:x//www.propublica.
org /article/epa-chemicals-found-in-wyo. -drinking-water-might-be-from-frack-
ing-825; Mark Clayton, Controversial Path to Possible Glut of Natural Gas,
CHRISTIAN ScL. MONITOR, Sept. 17, 2008, at 25.
19 See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in
Oil and Gas Pruductiun and the Nued tu ReTisAit Regulatiun, 20 FuR-AM ENVL.
L. REV. 115, 129-33 (2009).
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Another manner in which fracking differs from conventional
oil and gas development is in the locations in which it occurs. While
much conventional development occurs in sparsely populated parts
of the country, major fracking areas, such as the Marcellus Shale,
can be densely populated. Surface impacts are therefore more likely
to occur in closer proximity to homes and people.
Because fracking's impact on the surface estate is greater
than that caused by traditional oil and gas development operations,
is it possible that some of the activities undertaken by West Virginia
mineral owners employing fracking techniques fall outside the scope
of what the parties to an original lease or severance deed could have
contemplated? If so, what are the implications?
II. Srur ESTATES
In general, a property owner owns a parcel of land in fee
simple, meaning that her title extends us que ad coelum et ad inferos,
usually translated as meaning that the rights of the surface owner
extend upward to the heavens (ad coelum) and downward to the
center of the earth (ad inferos).0 Among the rights held by an owner
in fee simple are the rights to extract valuable minerals, including
oil and gas, from beneath the surface. Accordingly, when the person
who owns the surface rights also owns the mineral rights under
the land, a drilling company must lease the mineral rights from the
owner before extracting the natural gas. In this situation, the surface
owner can protect herself from the impacts of fracking, either by
refusing to lease the subsurface rights at all or by negotiating terms
in the lease that either prevent harm or require the drilling company
to remediate and/or compensate for any damage, environmental or
otherwise. In addition, the landowner will be paid a royalty on all
of the gas extracted from the well or wells on her property, meaning
that any physical damage to the property is offset by the income
received from the well,
20 John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REv. 979,
980-81 (2008). There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule, most notably
pertaining to air space. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
21See David McMahon, The AMarcellus Shale: The Need to Change Real Estate
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However, it is a "well-established principle [] of property
law ... that the land may be horizontally severed into surface and
subsurface estates so that legal title vests in different owners."
Under this "split estate" scenario, ownership of the surface estate is
distinct from ownership of the minerals found beneath the surface,
xwhich can include coal, oil, and natural gas, among other valuable
commodities.
The surface and mineral estates of many plots were severed
decades or more in the past, when a previous owner of the whole
plot granted the subsurface minerals to another party.23 As a result of
subsequent transactions, many current West Virginia residents own
a surface estate, while a separate party owns the coal, oil, and/or gas
beneath the surface and enjoys a limited easement over the surface.
In this situation, the mineral or subsurface estate traditionally
has been considered the dominant estate, while the surface owner
has the servient estate.24 As this terminology indicates, when the
rights and interests of the two estates come into conflict, the mineral
estates interests generally prevail. In particular, at common law:
Unless there is an express lease provision to the
contrary, an oil and gas lessee has the right to use as
much of the surface estate as is reasonably necessary
for its operations. This right includes the legal
Transaction Documents, W. VA. LAWYER 26, 27 (April-June 2010) (noting that the
first-month royalty from a Marcellus Shale well can be as much as $5,000).
2 Christopher M. Alspach, Surface Use by the Mineral Owner: How AMuch Ac-
commodation is Required Under Current Oil and Gas Law?, 55 OKLA. L. RLv. 89,
91 (2002); see also Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining &
Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55, 60 (1898) ("Unquestionably at common law the owner
of the soil might convey his interest in mineral beneath the surface without relin-
quishing his title to the surface.").
23 See Clinton W. Smith, Note, Disturbing Surface Rights: What Does "Reason-
ably Necessary" AMean in West Virginia?, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 817, 824 (1983)
(stating that "most mineral estates were severed from the surface estate" "[a]t the
first part of the [20th] century").
24 See Alspach, supra note 22, at 91; Rick D. Davis, Jr. & Chris Aycock, Oil Patch
Environmental and Surface Damage Litigation, in 60 INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS
LA 118 (2009).
25 See BOSSELMAN, El AL., supra note 8, at 461; Alspach, supra note 22, at 91.
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privilege to use the surface in a way that interferes
with the surface owner's use of the land and that
significantly damages the surface, without the legal
obligation to make any compensation whatsoever. 6
The reasoning underlying this doctrine is that ownership
of the minerals has no value unless one can remove them from
the earth: removal of the minerals necessarily involves using the
surface." "[A] grant or reservation of the minerals would be wholly
worthless if the grantee or reserver of the minerals could not enter
upon the land in order to explore for and extract the minerals granted
or reserved.""
Under the traditional view, owners of surface estates
have very few legal rights regarding oil and gas development on
their property. As the Bureau of Land Management put it in a
report to Congress in 2006, surface owners "bear the brunt of the
development, have their lives and land changed forever, and receive
little if any compensation."" This "seeming unfairness" has led to
judicial and statutory changes to the common-lax baseline in many
states, including West Virginia.t In this article, we focus on surface
owners' potential use of contractual arguments to protect themselves
from some of the impacts of hydraulic fracturing. Before discussing
those arguments, however, we briefly explain the statutory rights
26 Ernest E. Smith, The Growing Demand for Oil and Gas and the Potential In-
pact Upon Rural Land, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAs & ENERGY L. 1, 5-6 (2008); accord
BARLow BURKE & ROBERT BECK, THE LAW AND REGLTLxrION OF MINING: MINERALS
To ENERGY 94 (2010).
27 See, e.g., Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 853, 854 (W. Va. 1909); Cyril A Fox,
Jr., Private Mining Law in the 1980's: The Last Ten ears and Beyond, 92W VA.
L. REv. 795, 827 (1990) ("Mineral ownership has no value unless one can remove
the mineral from the earth, process it, sell it, or consume it. For this reason, the
mineral estate has a right, easement, or servitude for use of the surface estate in
order to remove the minerals.").
28Tarrant Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. One v. Haupt, Inc., 854
S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. 1993).
29 UNITED STATEs DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUEAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, ENERGY
POLICY ACT OF 2005- SECTION 1835 SPLIT ESTATE, FEDERAL OIL AND GAs LEASING
AND DEVELOPIENT PRACTICEs, A REPORT TO CONGREss 9 (2006).
0 Fox, supra note 27, at 832.
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that surface owners have under West Virginia's well control and
damage compensation acts.)
Several states have adopted surface owner compensation
statutes. 2 The purposes of the statutes include minimizing harm to
the surface owners, preventing harm in the form of the depletion
of land available for agricultural or other purposes, and allowing
the development of mineral resources to proceed without lengthy
disputes between surface owners and developers. These statutes
generally require the gas developer to notif the surface owner
before starting drilling operations and to compensate the surface
owner for certain types of damage to the surface. Unlike at common
law, under these statutes the reasonableness of the developer's use
of the surface is not a defense - the standard is "one of strict liability
where the mineral developer's only defense is that the damage did
not occur or was not as great as claimed." The specific types of
harms that are compensable under these statutes vary, but generally
include "loss of agricultural production and income, lost land value,
and lost value to improvements caused by the drilling operations.">
West Virginia adopted its original Oil and Gas Production
Damage Compensation Act in 1983.36 The Act specifically equalized
the surface and mineral estates, contrary to common law. In 2011,
' See W VA. CODE §§22-6A-1-24, 22-6B-1-8, 22-7-1-8 (2011).
32 See Davis & Aycock, supra note 24, at 152 (identifying twelve states - North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Montana, South Dakota, West Virginia, Tennessee, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Colorado - with surface damage
statutes).
1Alpsach, supra note 22, at 110.
34 John F. Welborn, New Rights ofSurface Owners: Changes in the Dominant/Ser-
vient Relationship Between the Mineral and Surface Estates, in 40 PROCEEDINGS OF
Tm ROCKY MoNmTAIN MiNERAL LAW INSTITUTE § 22.03 [2] [a], § 22.03 [2] [b] (1994)
(noting that the West Virginia statute provides for strict liability); Alspach, supra
note 22, at 115 ("[T]he mineral owner must pay for damage to the surface regard-
less of whether or not the mineral owner's use of the surface is reasonable.").
,Alspach, supra note 22, at 116.
6 1983 W.Va. Acts, ch. 154.
3 See W. VA. CODE § 22-7-l(a)(1) (2011) ("The Legislature finds [that] . . .
[e]xploration for and development of oil and gas reserves in this state must coexist
with the use, agricultural or otherxise, of the surface of certain land and that each
constitutes a right equal to the other."')(emphasis added).
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West Virginia adopted a slightly modified version of the Act - the
Oil and Gas Horizontal Well Production Damage Act - specifically
applicable to horizontal wells, thereby prospectively eliminating
application of the original act to any horizontal well." While both
the original act and the new act (relevant here because most fracked
wells involve horizontal drilling) provide surface owners additional
protections not available at common law, they are still of limited
benefit. First, they provide compensation only for enumerated
harms.39 They do not, therefore, allow compensation for "annoyance
and inconvenience." 40 Second, the surface owner will not receive
compensation until after the completion of drilling operations (or, if
the surface owner negotiates a settlement prior to the conclusion of
operations, she risks that the damages will eventually prove greater
than the compensation she received). Third, and most importantly,
the availability of compensation after the fact does nothing to prevent
the occurrence or location of harmful practices in the first place.
There are few statutory limitations on the activities of gas
developers that surface owners can enforce, though some do exist.
For example, under the new Horizontal Well Act, a horizontal gas
well may not be drilled within 250 feet of an existing water well and
the center of a well pad must be at least 625 feet from an occupied
dwelling unless the surface owner consents in writing or the
Secretary grants a variance. 4 ' The West Virginia Surface Owners'
Rights Organization therefore recommends that surface owners drill
water wells on any part of their property that they want to protect
(e.g., a future home site).4' The setback provisions, however, limit
Id. § 22-6B-l(c)-(d). West Virginia also adopted at the same time the Horizontal
Well Act, which more thoroughly controls horizontal drilling practices. See id
§ 22-6A-1-8.
39Both acts allow compensation for lost income from being unable to put land
occupied by drilling operations to a pre-existing use, damaged crops, damage to a
water supply, the cost of repair of personal property, and the diminution in value
of the surface after the completion of surface operations. Id. §§ 22-6B-3, 22-7-7.
40Depeterdy v. Cabot Oil & Gas Co., No. CA-97-966-2, 1999 WL 33229744 at *4
(S.D. W. Va. Sept. 13, 1999), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. 2000).
41 W VA. CODE §22-6A-12.
42West Virginia Surface Owners' Rights Org., Top 10 TUps for Surface Owners Be-
foreWhen the Oil and Gas Driller Shows Up, http://"."www.wvsoro.org/resources!
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only the location of surface operations and not the nature of the
activities in which the gas developer can engage. The next part
of this article outlines legal strategies that could provide surface
owners with a more robust means of protecting themselves from the
detrimental surface impacts of fracking.
III. INTERPRETING SURFACE EASEMENTS IN WEST VIRGINIA
To enjoin a developer from engaging in activities that
excessively burden the surface estate, a surface owner can show
that the developer's actions exceed the scope of the mineral owner's
easement over the surface. Because of the rise of fracking operations,
many West Virginia surface owners find their property burdened in
ways they could not have imagined even a few years ago. For these
owners, the burdens may not have been contemplated by the parties
to the governing legal instrument at the time the estates were severed
or at any later time the surface owner entered into an agreement
with the mineral estate owner regarding the mineral owner's use of
the surface. Practices not contemplated may exceed the scope of an
easement. 43
A mineral estate owner may have either an express or
implied right to burden the surface estate to extract minerals.44
the deed severing the surface and mineral estates contains a specific
provision enumerating the mineral owner's rights over the surface,
then the mineral owner is said to have an express easement. The
scope of this express easement over the surface is determined by
the language of the deed and, if that language is ambiguous, the
likely intent of the parties at the time.5 A surface owner challenging
a practice as in excess of an express easement can argue, first, that
advice/advicel16.html (last visited May 26, 2012).
43 The original Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act includes leg-
islative findings and legal presumptions on when rotary drilling, which is used
to bore a horizontal well, would have been in the contemplation of the parties to
a severance deed. See W VA. CODE § 22-7-1(a)(2)-(4). These provisions are not
included in the Horizontal Well Act and their relevance, if any, to horizontal wells
in light of the recent enactment has not yet been analyzed.
44 , e.g., Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725 (. Va. 1980).
45 See, e.g., Lowxe x. Guy an Eagles, 273 S.E.2d 91, 92-93 (W. Va. 1980).
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an easement granting specific rights does not permit an activity not
covered by those rights, and, second, that even if the general type
of activity is permitted under a provision of the easement, the use
of particular new technology or techniques was not contemplated
by the original parties to the instrument creating the easement and
would "unreasonably increase the burden placed upon the servient
tenement." 6
When the deed does not grant the mineral owner an express
easement over the surface, mineral owners have an implied easement
to use the surface, because, as discussed above, minerals otherwise
could not be extracted) When determining the scope of an implied
easement, the surface owner may take advantage of West Virginia's
unique formulation of the accommodation doctrine, which generally
restricts a mineral owner's implied easement over the surface to
actions that are necessary to enjoyment of the mineral estate and do
not unreasonably increase the burden on the surface estate.
A. Practices that Exceed the Scope of an Easement
This section will elaborate on three legal arguments a surface
owner might advance to challenge and ultimately enjoin fracking
practices that fall outside the scope of the mineral estate holder's
easement over the surface. One argument applies to unambiguous
express easements, a second applies to generally-worded or
otherwise ambiguous express easements, and a third applies to
implied easements. Because the legal standard defining the scope of
the easement varies based on the type of easement, the first step is to
discern the type of easement governing the surface and subsurface
46Kell v. Appalachian Power Co., 289 S.E.2d 450, 454 (W. Va. 1982).
47Phillips v. Fox, 458 S.E.2d 327, 332 (W. Va. 1995) ("It is well-settled that own-
ership of a mineral estate includes the right to enter upon and use the superjacent
surface by such manner and means as is fairly reasonable and necessary to reach
and remove the minerals."); see also PATRICK H. MAREN & BRUCE M. KRAMER,
WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAs LAw § 218 (Abridged 2d ed. 2004) ("The in-
strument creating the mineral, royalty or leasehold interest may .. .be completely
silent concerning surface easements. In such case, it has been held that such sur-
face easements are implied as will permit the lessee or mineral owner to enjoy the
interest conveyed.").
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relationship.
When a mineral owner's easement over the surface is recorded
in a document such as a severance deed, an express easement is
formed. An express easement is "a nonpossessory right to enter and
use land in possession of another," which is memorialized in writing
in such a way that satisfies the statute of frauds. 8 Such an easement
will grant the mineral owner certain rights of way or other rights to
use the surface. For example, the express easement contained in one
West Virginia severance deed provides:
Grantors.. . do hereby grant and convey unto the
Grantee, all the oil and gas in and under the following
described tract of land ... together with the right of
way, the right to lay pipes to convey water, oil, steam
and gas. the right to operate machinery and other
appliances thereon fbr the production of gasoline
from natural gas, and to have and appropriate
sufficient water; oil and gas ftom the premises. . .
In construing the scope of a contract (including a deed
containing an express easement), West Virginia courts first look
to whether the language describing the easement is ambiguous.5o
Whether the document is ambiguous is a question of law properly
decided by a judge."' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
allows extrinsic evidence of the original parties' likely intent to be
used in determining whether a document is ambiguous, even wx hen
the text on its face appears to be clear.52 Such extrinsic evidence can
include common industry practices at the time the easement was
created. For example, in Energy Development Corp. v. fossj the
48 See generally RLSTATEENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, §§ 1.2, 2.7 (2000).
49 The language quoted comes from a West Virginia severance deed dated 1940
(emphasis added) (on file with author).
CEnergy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 143-45 (W Va. 2003).
* Id. at 143; accord Flanagan v. Stalnaker, 607 S.E.2d 765, 769 (W. Va. 2004).
2 Energy Dev. Corp., 591 S.E.2d at 143 ("We also agree with the lower court that
a document that may appear on its face to be free from ambiguity, may be deemed
latently ambiguous.").
*Id. at 13 8.
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court examined whether a grant purporting to give "all" of the oil and
gas under the subsurface included coalbed methane. It concluded
that the deed was ambiguous because the deed was created before
the widespread discovery of coalbed methane in the state. 4 Although
the court in Moss interpreted deed language constituting the mineral
grant itself - rather than deed language creating an easement - it
nonetheless supports an argument that an express easement may
be ambiguous not only by virtue of inconsistencies in its text, but
also when changes in extraction practices call into question whether
particular modern practices fall within the easement's broad
language.
1. Unambiguous Express Easements
When an easement is deemed unambiguous its plain
language will control - even when there is contrary evidence of the
parties' intent." Given the substantially greater surface impacts of
fracking compared to traditional gas development, a broadly-worded
easement that is found to be unambiguous will generally allow a gas
developer to carry out particular surface operations that would not
have been contemplated by the parties to the original transaction.
Thus a finding that an easement is unambiguous would generally be
unfavorable for a surface owner.
Even in this situation, however, the surface owner is not
without legal arguments. In particular, even if a court finds an
express easement to be unambiguous, a surface owner can still argue
that the developer cannot engage in practices that are not covered
by the language. 6 If a deed contains a list of specific, permissible
54 Id. at 143.
See Flanagan, 607 S.E.2d at 770 ("An oil and gas lease which is clear in its
provisions and free from ambiguity, either latent or patent, should be considered
on the basis of its express provisions and is not subject to a practical construction
by the parties.") (quoting Cotiga Dev't Co. v. United Fuel Gas, 128 S.E.2d 626,
631-32 (W. Va. 1962) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fraternal Order of Po-
lice, Lodge No. 69 v. City of Fairmont, 468 S.E.2d 712, 715 (W. Va. 1996) ([J]t is
for a trial court to determine whether the terms in an integrated agreement are un-
ambiguous, and, if so, to construe the contract according to its plain meaning.").
56 See MARN & KRAMER, supra note 47 § 218.1 ("If the instrument creating an
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surface uses, one can argue under the interpretive canon expressio
unius est exclusio alteris that any use not listed is excluded. If,
for example, a deed explicitly permits only vertical drilling, a
surface owner could argue that practices exclusively associated
with horizontal drilling are not within the scope of the easement.
Likewise, if a deed explicitly allows a mineral owner to drill a well
to extract natural gas, a surface owner could argue that reinjecting
water or gas into the well for fracking or storage falls outside the
scope of the easement.
This strategy is unlikely to be successful, however, if the
deed includes not only a list of specific rights, but also a catch-all
provision granting to the mineral owner, for example, all rights
necessary
for the purpose of investigating, exploring,
prospecting, drilling and mining for and producing
oil, gas and all other minerals, laying pipe lines,
building roads, tanks, power stations, telephone lines
and other structures thereon and on, over and across
(the surface estate) to produce, save, take care of,
treat, transport and own said products. 5
A surface owner might argue that, under the principle of
ejusdein generis, the general grant should be assumed to cover only
low-impact uses similar to those that precede it - and, for example,
not higher-impact uses that may be associated with fracking. In
interest in minerals expressly limits the surface rights of the mineral or royalty
owner or lessee there appears no basis for the implication of surface easements in
excess of those expressly granted.").
S7 See Fisher v. W. Va. Coal & Transport Co., 73 S.E.2d 633, 644 (W Va. 1952)
(Given, J., dissenting) (arguing that, through the principle of expressio unius, a
deed that granted the mining rights relating to "said coal" did not allow the use of
the passageways through the property to mine coal from other lands).
8Ottis v. Haas, 569 S.W2d 508, 513 n.3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (referring to this
provision as a "general purpose clause") (emphasis removed).
9W Va. Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d 717, 719-20 (W. Va. 1976)
(applying the doctrine of ejusdem; generis, Xhich it described as meaning that
"w here general wxords followx an enumeration of persons or things, such general
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West Virginia, however, such an argument is unlikely to succeed. In
this situation, the West Virginia courts have found that the principle
that "the grant of express mining easements restricts or negates
implied rights" does not apply. 0 Indeed, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has found that, rather than being constrained by
the more specific grants that precede it, a broad grant at the end of
a list may impliedly expand the specific list to include compatible
uses.61
Nonetheless, because, as discussed below, older easements
using such broad language are likely to be construed as ambiguous,
West Virginia law offers another option to surface owners seeking to
limit mineral owners' discretion.
2. Ambiguous Express Easements and Implied
Easements
When the easement is ambiguous, surface owners are in a
stronger position. West Virginia courts will construe the easement
to grant only those rights that would have been contemplated by
the original parties at the time of its creation. In addition, West
Virginia courts limit the rights of mineral owners under ambiguous
express easements, as well as implied easements, through a version
of the "accommodation doctrine" that is particularly favorable to
surface owners. Therefore, when faced with an express easement
that contains broad language favorable to the mineral owner, it is
likely in the surface owner's best interest to argue that the easement
is ambiguous.
An ambiguity in a deed can be either patent - apparent on the
face of the document itself - or latent - apparent only with reference
words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind, class or nature as those specifically
mentioned," to hold that sand and gravel were not included in a reservation of "the
oil, gas and other minerals in and under said land").
6See Buffalo Mining Co., 267 S.E.2d at 725.
1See id. ("[W]here the severance deed contains broad rights for utilization of the
surface in connection with underground mining activities and these broad rights
are coupled with a number of specific surface uses, courts will be inclined to imply
compatible surface uses that are necessary to the underground mining activity.").
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to extrinsic evidence.6 To argue that a given easement is ambiguous
and that a court should thus look to extrinsic evidence of the original
parties' intent in interpreting it, a surface owner therefore can, but
does not need to, show that the document is ambiguous within its
four corners - for example, because it contradicts itself or uses
vague wording.63 Even if the document is not patently ambiguous,
in accordance with the foss decision discussed above, the surface
owner can bring forward extrinsic evidence of extraction practices
known at the time of the easement's creation and argue that, despite
any seeming clarity of the instrument's language, the gap between
past practices and current practices is so great that the original
parties to the easement could not have contemplated the practices
presently sought to be employed. If legitimized by a court, this
argument would render the easement ambiguous as to whether it
includes such practices.
i. The Evolution of the Interpretation of
Ambiguous Easements in West Virginia
When specifically-granted rights are deemed ambiguous,
West Virginia has common law canons that a surface owner can
employ to argue that certain activities undertaken by mineral
developers are outside the proper scope of a dominant estate's
easement.
First, if a court concludes that the terms of the express
easement are ambiguous, it "must embark upon a search for the intent
of the parties," and will "interpret[] and construe[] [the language]
as of the date of its execution."6 4 Courts typically look to extrinsic
evidence to determine the likely intent of the original parties to the
easement." Relevant extrinsic evidence for mining easement cases
2 Flanagan, 607 S.E.2d at 769 n.4 ("A latent ambiguity arises when the instru-
ment upon its face appears clear and unambiguous, but there is some collateral
matter which makes the meaning uncertain.").
See Energy Dev. Corp., 591 S.E.2d at 143-45.
4Id. at 144 (quoting Oresta v. Romano Bros., 73 S.E.2d 622 (W Va. 1952)).
6 Fraternal Order of Police, 468 S.E.2d at 716 n.7 ("Exploring the intent of the
contracting parties often, but not always, involves marshaling facts extrinsic to
the language of the contract document. When this need arises, these facts together
SURFACE EASEMENTS
may include the technological details of contemporary extraction
practices and a comparison to historical practices. 0
In determining whether an activity falls within the scope of
an ambiguous easement, the particular question of the parties' intent
that West Virginia courts seek to answer is whether the activity
burdens the surface estate beyond what the original parties to the
deed would have contemplated. 7 The contours of this inquiry have
evolved over the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-
forst.
Early case law found that when a given surface use would
not have been in the contemplation of the parties to the lease or deed
at the time it was created - as indicated by evidence of contemporary
mining practices - such use was considered to be beyond the scope
of the easement. For example, in West Frginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. Strong,68 the court found that surface-removal mining exceeded
the scope of an easement when
it was the manifest intention of the parties to preserve
intact the surface of the entire tract, subject to the
use of the owner of the coal 'at convenient point or
points' in order 'to mine, dig, excavate and remove
with reasonable inferences extractable therefrom are superimposed on the am-
biguous words to reveal the parties' discerned intent."); see also Flanagan, 607
S.E.2d at 768 (holding that "it is proper to consider extrinsic evidence in order to
ascertain the intention of the parties" to an ambiguous oil and gas lease). The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not clearly spoken to the line between
using extrinsic evidence of intent to find ambiguity in an express easement and
using extrinsic evidence of intent to construe that ambiguity if found. See Energy
Dev. Corp., 8591 S.E.2d at 143-44 (stating that extrinsic evidence of intent can be
used to find ambiguity, and then determining based on parties' intent that a broad
grant of gas and oil cannot be read to include coalbed methane, which would have
been unknown to parties at the time grant was drawn). For this reason, evidence of
a latent ambiguity may look very similar to the evidence of intent used to construe
that ambiguity.
6 See, e.g., Lowe, 273 S.E.2d at 93 (remanding for "evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether the technology of hauling is so different from anything contem-
plated in 1902.").
67 See Kell, 289 S.E.2d at 454-56.
6s 42 S.E.2d 46 (W Va. 1947).
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all of said coal' by the usual method at that time
known and accepted as common practice in Brooke
County.69
The court did "not believe that this included the practice
known as strip mining.""o
In 1980., in Buffdlo Mining, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals interpreted the Strong line of decisions to stand
for the proposition that resolving an ambiguous surface easement
turns primarily on "wx hether the easement sought was substantially
compatible with the surface rights granted the mineral owner and
whether it substantially burdens the surface owner's estate"- not
simply the drafting parties' intent. One reason that the court in
Buffalo ining may haxve decided to abandon the strict rule of limiting
surface uses to those in the contemplation of the parties to the deed
wxas its unusual factual context. In that case, the surface use being
sought by the mineral estate owner (stringing powxer cables) wxould
not have imposed any greater burden on the surface owner than a use
both contemplated by the original parties and explicitly mentioned in
the easement (stringing telephone cables). The twxo practices wxere not
only compatible, they were almost identical. The equities of the case
therefore favored the mineral owner's proposed use.
69Id at 49.
7 Id; see also Oresta, 73 S.E.2d at 627 (reaching the same conclusion when
"[i]t is evident from the language of the reservation of the mining rights, that, at
the date of the deed of severance .. ,. the parties to the deed intended that the coal
should be mined and removed by the usual method then known and accepted as
common practice.. . and that such method, as it then existed, did not include the
practice of mining and removing coal by strip mining"); Browxn v. Crozer Coal &
Land Co., 107 S.E.2d 777, 787 (W Va. 1959) (applying Strong to find that auger
mining, a form of surface-removal mining, exceeded the scope of an easement).
~267 S.E.2d at 724 n.3 (holding that an express easement to string telephone
cables also allowed the easement holder to install power cables, but finding that
Strong was correctly decided "on the more fundamental principle that a right to
surface use wxill not be implied wxhere it is totally incompatible wxith the rights of
the surface owner"). In dissent, Justice Harshbarger asserted that such an interpre-
tation of Strong would essentially do away with parties' intent as an interpretation
tool. Id. at 726-27 (Harshbarger, J., dissenting). In practice, the meaning of com-
patible and contemplated may differ little, if at all, because evidence of the former
may be used to demonstrate the latter.
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Later cases have interpreted Buffalo ining as creating a
two-part test that a surface use must meet in order to fall within
the scope of an ambiguous express easement: first, the use must
be necessary for enjoyment of the mineral estate, and second, it
must not "unreasonably increase the burden placed on the servient"
estate as compared to previous practice." Two cases demonstrate
the operation of this test and the continued relevance of the
contemplation of the parties.
First, in Lowe v. Guyan Eagles Coal Co., the owner of the
mineral rights wanted to use a right-of-way over the property "to
transport men and materials to and from the strip mine" on another
property.74" The 1902 deed severing the surface and mineral estates
gave the mineral owner "full rights of ways to, from and over said
premises by the construction and use of roads ... or otherwise, for the
purpose of... shipping or transporting all of said minerals... whether
contained on said premises or elsexw here." 5 The express easement thus
unequivocally allowed the mineral owner to use the right of way in
connection with its coal mine on an adjacent property. In addition, this
use of the surface was presumably necessary for mining operations.
Nevertheless, the heavy machinery used for transportation in 1980
was quite different from what would have been used in 1902 and
could have imposed a greater burden on the surface estate. The court
therefore held that "no use may be made of a right-of-way, different
from that established at the time of its creation so as to burden the
servient estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at the time of
the grant."6 The court remanded the case "for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the technology of hauling is so different from
anything contemplated in 1902 that it overburdens the surface owner's
estate and is beyond the deed's reservation: whether the burden now
is alien to that generally contemplated by parties to such deeds at the
time and place of its execution." 7
72 Kell, 289 S.E.2d at 454.
71273 S.E.2d at 91.
74 1d at 92.
Id at 92-93.
6 Id at 93.77 1d
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Second, in Kell v. Appalachian Power Co., the court
addressed a power company's right-of-way, in connection with
which the company had the right "to cut and at its option, remove
from said premises . . . any trees, overhanging branches or other
obstructions which may endanger the safety or interfere with the
use of said poles and towers or fixtures or wires."" The court
held that, under this language, the power company could not use
aerial broadcast spraying of toxic herbicides to control vegetation
in the right-of-way.' In reaching this conclusion, the court noted
that aerial broadcast spraying of herbicides was "not necessary
to the protection of the power company 's equipment" and that it
"impermissibly interfere[d] with the grantor-owner's rights and
interests." 0 Yet, in addition to citing the two parts of the Buffalo
Mining test, the court also relied on the contemplation approach,
noting that '[t]he use of aerial broadcast spraying of herbicides to
control vegetation along a right-of-way was unknown in 1939 and
could not have been within the specific contemplation of the parties
to the 1939 indenture involved in this case." 81
A decade later, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
West Virginia law, stated that Buffalo Mining requires courts to
consider "whether the use sought to be included within an easement
grant is substantially compatible with the explicit grant" and
"'whether it substantially burdens the servient estate." 8
West Virginia law thus requires that a given activity meet
three criteria to fall within an ambiguous easement over the
surface: it must (1) be substantially compatible with the terms of
the easement, (2) be necessary to enjoyment of the mineral estate,
and (3) not unreasonably or substantially increase the burden on
the surface estate beyond what was contemplated by the original
parties to the easement. This test bears a strong resemblance to the
accommodation doctrine, as applied in some other states, as well as
78289 S.E.2d at 453.
791d at 457.
o Id. at 45 6.
81 d
82 C R TV, Inc. v. Shannondale, 27 F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis mi
original).
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to the test that West Virginia courts apply to implied easements. We
therefore briefly describe the accommodation doctrine and compare
it to West Virginia's tests for ambiguous easements and implied
easements.
ii. The Accommodation Doctrine
The courts of several states have softened the harsh
common law rules regarding the surface rights of mineral owners -
described in Part III, above - through a balancing test known as the
accommodation doctrine. The first clear statement of this doctrine
was made in the Texas Supreme Court decision Getty Oil Co. v
Jones.13 Jones, the surface owner, farmed the land and used a center-
pivot irrigation system that could clear obstacles up to seven feet
high.? Getty, the mineral owner, installed pumping units for two oil
wells that were seventeen feet and thirty-four feet high. The result
was that Jones could not use his irrigation system effectively."
Jones sued to enjoin Getty from using the airspace above the surface
in a way that prevented the operation of his irrigation system. The
Texas Supreme Court ruled for Jones, relying in particular on the
fact that other oil producers on Jones's property had successfully
installed pumping units in below-ground concrete cellars that did
not interfere with the irrigation system." In particular, the court held
that
where there is an existing use by the surface owner
wxhich would otherwise be precluded or impaired,
and where under the established practices in the
industry there are alternatives available to the lessee
wx hereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules
of reasonable usage of the surface may require the
adoption of an alternative by the lessee."
8 470 S.W2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
84Id. at 620.
, Id.
86Id at 622.
871d
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The court described this holding as "an accommodation
between the two estates.""
Under the accommodation doctrine, as established in Getty
Oil, there are thus three requirements that must be met to limit a
surface use: (1) the surface owner has an existing use of the surface;
(2) the mineral owner's proposed use of the surface will preclude
or impair the surface owner's use: and (3) the mineral owner has
reasonable alternatives available.8 Some cases add a fourth,
countervailing requirement, namely that "the surface owner's
existing use is the only reasonable means of developing the land
available to him.""
For several reasons, the original formulation of the
accommodation doctrine, while helpful to Mr. Jones in Getty Oil,
is only marginally more favorable for surface owners than the
traditional common law. First, the surface owner bears the burden
of proving all of these elements.9' Second, the Texas Supreme Court
subsequently limited the doctrine by specifying that the "reasonable
alternative methods" must be available to the developer "on the
leased premises." 9' Third, "the impairment experienced by the
surface owner must be, at the very least, substantial." Fourth, the
1 Id. at 623.
89Alspach, supra note 22, at 94.
90 Daniel R. Hafer, Daniel B. Mathis & Logan W Simmons, -4 Practical Guide to
Operator/Surface-Owner Disputes and the Current State of the Accommodation
Doctrine, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 47, 59 (2010); see also Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant
Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 870 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1994) ("Moreover, the surface owner must also show that any alternative
uses of the surface, other than the existing use, are impracticable and unreason-
able under all the circumstances.").
91 See Alspach, supra note 22, at 94.
92 Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. 1972). In that case, the
surface owner, a farmer, complained that the developer's use of well water from
a non-replenishing aquifer would harm his ability to irrigate his crops. The court
held that the developer was not obligated to buy and bring in water from else-
where to prevent this harm to the surface owner. The court stated that, "[t]o hold
that Sun can be required to purchase water from other sources or owners of other
tracts in the area, would be in derogation of the dominant estate." Id.
93 Hafer et al., supra note 90, at 63. In one cae, a farmer objected to the construc-
tion of caliche roads in place of dirt roads. Davis v. Devon Energy Production Co.,
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requirement that the mineral owner have reasonable alternatives
available has been held to mean that "if there is but one way to
produce the minerals, the mineral owner has the right to pursue his
use. 94 As a result, in Texas, the accommodation doctrine "has not
made a large difference in the ordinary surface use case and the
decision of Getty has often been limited or distinguished.""
iii. The Accommodation Doctrine in West Virginia
As described above, the West Virginia courts have held
that, under an ambiguous express easement, a surface use must be
compatible with existing uses and/or the terms of the easement,
necessary to enjoyment of the mineral estate, and not unreasonably
or substantially increase the burden on the surface estate beyond
what would have been contemplated by the original parties to the
easement. West Virginia applies a similar test when interpreting the
scope of an implied easement.
If a severance deed contains no express surface easement,
West Virginia law nevertheless recognizes an implied easement.96
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals limits implied
surface easements to those activities that are "fairly necessary to
the enjoyment of the mineral estate."9 On its face, this standard
136 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). The evidence indicated that caliche
roads would "cause. . . problems" for the farmer, especially with plowing, but that
it "would [not] destroy [the] ability to conduct a profitable farming operation."
Id. at 425. The court therefore held that the surface use was permissible under the
accommodation doctrine. Similarly, another Texas court found that the surface
owners could not have tank batteries removed from grazing land because they had
demonstrated only "inconvenience," not that the surface use "materially interferes
with their use of the surface estate." Ottis, 569 S.W2d at 514.
94 Harper Estes & Douglas Prieto, Contracts as Fences: Representing the Agri-
cultural Producer in an Oil and Gas Environment, 73 TEX. B.J. 378, 380 (2010);
see also Alspach, supra note 22, at 97 ("[I]f there is only one way to produce the
minerals, such as vertical drilling, the mineral owner may pursue that use regard-
less of damage to the surface estate.").
95 Estes & Prieto, supra note 94, at 379.
96See Buffalo Mining, 267 S.E.2d at 725.
97 Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d 633, 636 (W Va. 1950) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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may appear more favorable to mineral developers than the test for
ambiguous express easements - a court could conceivably apply
it to conclude that any activity that is "necessary" to productive
extraction falls within the scope of the mineral owner's easement,
no matter how burdensome it is to the surface owner. However,
Buffdlo Mining, citing Adkins, rearticulated the standard, stating
that "any use of the surface by virtue of rights granted by a mining
deed must be exercised reasonably so as not to unduly burden the
surface owner's use."' While Buffdlo Mining required the court to
interpret a deed containing an express easement, the court made
clear that a reasonableness restriction applies to both express and
implied easements, and in fact applies more stringently to implied
easements, by stating that "where implied rather than express rights
are sought, the test of what is reasonable and necessary becomes
more exacting."9
In a subsequent decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals stated that it would not imply a right to surface mine
unless
it is demonstrated that, at the time the deed
was executed, surface mining was a known and
accepted common practice in the locality where
the land is located: that it is reasonably necessary
for the extraction of the mineral; and that it may
be exercised without any substantial burden to the
surface owner.10 0
This case clarified the nature of the "more exacting"
test for implied easements. Whereas the test for an ambiguous
express easement is whether the activity is necessary and does
not unreasonably increase the burden to the surface estate beyond
what the easement expressly permits, for implied easements it is
whether the activity is necessary and does not place any substantial
98 267 S.E.2d at 725 (emphasis added).
99 Id (emphasis added).
0oPhillps, 458 S.E.2d at 335.
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burden on the surface.' This case also reiterated the requirement
that the proposed practice (or, presumably, one with similar surface
impacts) was known and considered at the time the easement came
into existence.
In sum, for both ambiguous express easements and implied
easements, the West Virginia courts apply a modified version
of the accommodation doctrine - one that is more favorable for
surface owners than the traditional version. There are also two
other important distinctions between West Virginia law and the
accommodation doctrine.
First, West Virginia shifts the burden of proof from the surface
owner to the mineral owner. 0 2 This much is clear from Buffalo
Mining's statement that for a mineral owner's claim of an implied
right to use the surface "to be successful, it must be demonstrated
not only that the right is reasonably necessary for the extraction of
the mineral, but also that the right can be exercised without any
substantial burden to the surface owner."1 3 When "there is only one
method for a mineral owner to remove his minerals and this one
method will destroy the surface owner's use of his estate," under
the traditional accommodation doctrine, the mineral owner would
prevail, but "under... West Virginia's undue burden standard, as
announced in Buffdlo lining, the mineral owner could not use this
method of exploitation because it would be totally incompatible
with the rights of the surface owner."u
This shift in the burden of proof can have a significant
impact on the likelihood that a surface owner will prevail on a claim
that a particular fracking practice should be prohibited because its
0'Id
See Alspach, supra note 22, at 102 ("West Virginia places the burden upon the
mineral owner to demonstrate reasonable surface use, as opposed to placing the
burden on the surface owner to demonstrate unreasonable surface use or alterna-
tive mining methods."); Michelle Andrea Wenzel, The Model Surface Use Act and
AMineral Development Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for AMining Interests,
42 Am. U. L. RLv. 607, 638-39 (1993) (describing shift of burden to mineral es-
tate and claiming that this doctrinal change in effect makes the surface estate the
dominant estate).
103 267 S.E.2d at 725-26; accord Phillips, 458 S.E.2d at 335.
104 Smith, supra note 23, at 821.
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impact on the surface estate is overly burdensome. For example,
there is still considerable uncertainty about the impacts of hazardous
chemicals used in fracking solutions on well water. 10 If the surface
owner carried the burden of demonstrating that these chemicals
substantially impaired her use of the surface, she might face serious
hurdles, not the least of which would be establishing the baseline
from which deviation is sought to be proved. If, by contrast, the
burden is on the mineral owner to prove the safety of the chemicals,
a court is, by definition, more likely to require a mineral owner to
use non-toxic chemicals, particularly given that such mixtures are
now conunercially available."0
Another aspect of West Virginia law that is unusually
favorable to surface owners is its approach to changes in mining
technology. HWhile past commentators suggested that limitations on
technological advancement applied to coal cases did not apply to
oil and gas cases,o' the contemporary view is that West Virginia
"does not make a distinction between the extent of the right to
use the surface under coal severance deeds and the right under oil
and gas severances. "1os In Energy Development Corp. v. foss, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted that although many
technology change "cases concerned rights under coal deeds, and
not an oil and gas lease, we believe the same logic applies." 0 9 The
court thus held that in the oil and gas context, as in the coal context,
"a court wiii not find an implied right to conduct a given activity (not
0 The EPA is in the midst of a multi-year study designed to address this uncer-
tainty. See EPA, PLAN TO STUDY TM POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULiC FRACTURING
ON DRIMING WATER RESOURCES 1 (2011) ("The overarching goal of this research
is to answer the following questions: Can hydraulic fracturing impact drinking
water resources? If so, what conditions are associated with these potential im-
pacts?"), available at http://xwww.epa.gov/hfstudy/HFStudyPlan_110211_FI-
NAL _508.pdf.
106 See HLLIBURTON, CLEANSTIM HYDRAULIc FRACTURING FLUID SYSTEM (2010),
available at http://xwww.halliburton.com/public pe/contents/Data_ Sheets/web/H/
H07550.pdf.
107See Smith, supra note 23, at 824 ("[T]he Strong rule has never been applied to
oil and gas operations.").
8Davis &Aycock, supra note 24, at 148-49.
'p591 S.E.2d at 145.
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mentioned in the lease) unless that activity is clearly demonstrated
to have been a common practice in the area, at the time of the lease's
execution."'1o Guyan Eagles Coal Co. and Kell demonstrate the
xillingness of West Virginia courts to prevent a mineral owner from
using new technology that was both unknown at the time the deed
was executed and which substantially increases the burden on the
surface estate."'
Modern gas extraction through hydraulic fracturing involves
the use of several new technologies and practices that likely were
not in the contemplation of the parties to severance deeds signed
decades ago and that substantially increase the burden on the
surface estate. For example, the size of the well pad is significantly
larger than for a conventional natural gas well." 2 There is also
substantially more traffic to and from the well site.13 Fracked wells
can also involve the construction of large open-air impoundment
pits to store flowback." 4 Some of these pits have aerators or misters
that increase the rate of evaporation from the pits, thus increasing
the air pollution emitted from them. Still other wells are used for
the reinjection of fracking fluids after the gas has been extracted.
And, of course, the chemical recipes and propping agents being
used to frack efficiently are relatively new to the industry. All of
these are examples of developments and technologies that a surface
nOId.; see also Quintain Dev., LLC v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 556
S.E.2d 95, 100 (W. Va. 200 1) (noting that West Virginia has used the necessity and
unreasonably increased burden tests "to restrict the owner of an easement from
utilizing a technology that did not exist at the time an indenture was executed").
"n Guyan Eagles, 273 S.E.2d at 92-93 ("[N]o use may be made of a right-of-way,
different from that established at the time of its creation so as to burden the servi-
ent estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at the time of the grant.");
Kell, 289 S.E.2d at 454 ("[The] right to use technological innovations must be
weighed against the right of the grantor-owner to possess and use the adjacent
land.").
" NEW YORK STAE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, RLVISED DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON TM OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING
REGULATORY PROGRAM, at 5-10 - 5-11 (2011).
13 I1d. at Section VI.
114 The new Horizontal Well Act includes provisions on impoundment pits, includ-
ing authority for more specific regulation by the Department of Environmental
Protection. See W. VA. CODE §§ 22-6A-9, 22-6A-23 (2011).
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owner could potentially challenge as outside the contemplation of
the parties to an early severance deed and overly burdensome to the
surface estate.
Although West Virginia decisions create a favorable
doctrinal framework for surface owners, it is worth considering a
limitation to the viability of these arguments. While West Virginia
decisions explicitly list necessity and increased burden as two
separate requirements,"1 courts may be less inclined to find a
practice that increases the burden on the surface estate unreasonable
wx hen such a practice is absolutely necessary to making the mineral
estate productive. The decisions that have found a given action
to be outside the scope of an easement did not involve situations
in which an action was imperative to enjoyment of the easement
holder's estate, such that no adequate less burdensome alternatives
existed. For example, the Kell court specifically noted that there
were methods of keeping power lines clear other than the aerial
broadcast spraying of herbicides. 1 16 If the West Virginia courts did
adopt this approach to reasonableness, the difference between West
Virginia law and the traditional accommodation doctrine would be
less than suggested.
Reasonableness and necessity are also considered in relation
to each other under the common law duty to make a mineral estate
productive for the benefit ofroyalty interests. Under West Virginia
law, a mineral owner must do that which is reasonably necessary
to develop the property for the profit of those holding royalty
interests."1 This duty requires a mineral estate owner to do all it
reasonably can to make the mineral estate productive, and it treats
reasonableness not as an independent consideration but as a qualifier
"1 See Kell, 289 S.E.2d at 454.
" 
61d. at 456.
117 See, e.g., Adkins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas. Co., 168 S.E. 366, 367 (W. Va.
1932) ("[T]here is always, in the absence of an express covenant, an implied ob-
ligation on [an interest-holder in the mineral estates] part to drill the number
of wells reasonably necessary to develop the property and prevent drainage by
operation on adjoining lands."); see also George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King,
A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the AMarcellus Shale States, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS &
LNErN L. 155, 185-86 (2009) (discussing the prudent operator standard in West
Virginia).
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of necessity. If a mineral owner is thus under an obligation to take
actions necessary to production, a hannonious reading of the law
might grant a mineral owner permission to take such actions despite
their burden to the surface owner. It might then follow that truly
necessary actions are inherently reasonable, once again diminishing
the difference between West Virginia law and the traditional
accommodation doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Owners of surface estates have relatively few legal options
available to minimize surface damage from oil and gas operations.
The consequences of this lack of options are magnified in the
context of the current hydraulic fracturing boom, both because it
has brought oil and gas development to areas that have previously
seen little of it and because it increases the magnitude of surface
impacts. This article articulates legal avenues available to surface
owners in West Virginia who may wish to challenge the propriety of
specific fracking practices as falling outside the scope of a surface
easement held by the mineral owner. It focuses on the interpretation
of easements created by severance deeds executed at a time when
current unconventional extraction practices could not have been
contemplated by the contracting parties.
While easement analyses can include a review of the burden
to the surface, the nature of surface uses, the necessity of a practice,
and the compatibility of a practice with surface uses and/or easement
language, it is sometimes contractual intention that carries the day.
What the parties to a severance deed did or could have contemplated
at the time of severance can have a bearing on what is permissible
today. And given the disparity between extraction technology at the
time many severances took place in West Virginia and the potential
extent of unconventional extraction practices there today, the
application of contractual intention to surface use disputes can add
a powerful perspective.
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